Most US consumers are charged a near-constant retail price for electricity, despite substantial hourly variation in the wholesale market price. The Smart Grid is a set of emerging technologies that will facilitate "real-time pricing" for electricity and increase price elasticity of demand. This paper simulates the e¤ects of this increased demand elasticity using counterfactual simulations in a structural model of the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland electricity market. The model includes a di¤erent approach to the problem of multiple equilibria in multi-unit auctions: I nonparametrically estimate unobservables that rationalize past bidding behavior and use learning algorithms to move from the observed equilibrium counterfactual bid functions. This routine is nested as the second stage of a static entry game that models the Capacity Market, an important element of market design in some restructured electricity markets.
Introduction
In two-thirds of the United States, "restructured" wholesale markets for electricity have replaced the traditional vertically-integrated "natural monopoly." Since electricity is economically non-storable, wholesale prices vary from hour to hour, but most retail consumers are charged some average price that does not re ‡ect the wholesale price at the time of consumption. Not only does this induce these consumers to misallocate consumption across time relative to a structure under which they pay the "real-time price," but it also creates some of the central challenges of wholesale electricity market design. Inelastic demand gives producer …rms market power, and markups above marginal cost can cause an ine¢ cient allocation of production between …rms. Inelastic short-term demand also contributes to the need for minimum capacity regulations, called Planning Reserve Margins, to ensure that su¢ cient capacity enters to satisfy essentially any realization of quantity demanded 1 .
The "Smart Grid" is a set of electric power information technologies that many analysts believe will begin to change this picture. The 2009 US economic stimulus package includes $3.9 billion for Smart Grid projects, and utilities in many states are introducing Smart Grid technologies to large groups of customers. While these multifaceted technological changes will have many e¤ects, one of the principal economic implications of the Smart Grid is that it will increase the price elasticity of demand in each day's wholesale electricity auction. Two classes of Smart Grid technologies drive this e¤ect: advanced metering infrastructure that will make it cheaper to introduce real-time pricing (RTP) to retail consumers, and energy management technologies that will allow consumers to respond to prices more easily.
As Smart Grid technologies are expanded to a larger group of consumers, the increased price elasticity of demand would a¤ect equilibrium prices in a restructured wholesale market through three primary channels. First, the changes in demand would result in new equilibria along the existing aggregate supply curves. Second, increased demand elasticity would a¤ect producers' pro…t-maximizing bid markups, inducing them to bid closer to marginal cost. Third, this would change incentives for entry and exit and a¤ect the market institutions that govern total system capacity, the Reserve Margin and the "Capacity Market." There appears to be no existing model that captures all of these e¤ects in equilibrium.
This paper simulates the equilibrium e¤ects of an increase in the price elasticity of demand from expanding the Smart Grid to a large group of consumers, using a new simulation model of the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) market. The model takes the form of a two stage entry game, where in the …rst stage, potential entrants set capacity, and in the second stage, entrants bid along with incumbent …rms in the daily electricity market auctions. In equilibrium, entrants'zero pro…t conditions hold, and all entrants and incumbents set prices in the second stage to maximize pro…ts conditional on available capacity and beliefs about the distribution of other …rms'bids. This model is unique in its ability to endogenize both entry and strategic bidding behavior with detail on the market's …rms and institutions.
The second stage of this entry game models the central component of PJM and other restructured electricity markets: a daily multi-unit uniform price procurement auction. A key challenge in analyzing changes in demand elasticity or other counterfactuals in this setting is that a unique equilibrium can be shown to obtain only under restrictive conditions, such as symmetric …rms or linear marginal costs. As an alternative to such restrictions, I instead exploit the information in observed equilibria and assume a "learning" process through which …rms would move from initial conditions to a counterfactual equilibrium. Equilibrium selection by learning is relatively sensible in electricity markets given the daily repetition of auctions, and this approach allows the inclusion of realistic detail on …rms'costs and strategies and on the market price setting mechanism.
This procedure begins by non-parametrically estimating forward contract positions that rationalize …rms' bids between April 2003 and March 2004, exploiting con…dential bidding and cost data made available for this project. As pointed out by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) in the single-unit setting and Hortacsu (2002) in the multi-unit setting, structural primitives such as these forward contract positions are identi…ed under the assumption that …rms best respond given their beliefs about the probability distribution of competitors' bids. Estimating this distribution requires "pooling" over a set of identical auctions. If input costs vary or auctions are otherwise heterogeneous, they must be somehow "homogenized." One of the conceptual contributions of this paper is to implement an approach that admits relatively realistic incomplete information and allows a set of electricity auctions to be homogenized on observables; this in several senses may be preferable to the earlier approaches of and Hortacsu and Puller (2008) .
To simulate counterfactual equilibria, I hold supply-side primitives constant and change the demand functions to represent new Smart Grid consumers. I then simulate …rms iteratively best responding from their initial equilibrium bids until they converge to the counterfactual equilibrium. I show that the precise results are of course di¤erent under di¤erent learning algorithms, but they are relatively similar in a quantitative sense that I de…ne, and the di¤erent algorithms qualitatively generate the same policy conclusions. A second conceptual contribution of this paper is thus to explore equilibrium selection by learning in a relatively sensible application.
An additional challenge in modeling the equilibrium e¤ects of increased demand elasticity is that substantial welfare bene…ts should ‡ow through the reduced entry of new power plants, but nearly all electricity market models assume a …xed capital stock. To endogenize entry, the auction model is nested as the second stage of a two-stage entry model with heterogeneous entrants, building on the work of Borenstein (2005) . In the …rst stage, potential entrants of three di¤erent technologies set capacity. The Reserve Margin, which the market operator mandates to ensure system reliability, is modeled as a minimum constraint on the sum of entry across the three technologies. In equilibrium, the shadow price of this constraint is transferred to capacity owners, as it becomes the clearing price in a separate market called the Capacity Market. This is a third conceptual contribution of this paper: the …rst equilibrium model of a Capacity Market, which is an important feature of electricity market design in the eastern United States 2 .
The model is used to analyze a counterfactual scenario in which one-…fth of the market, or about 8 million households worth of of power demand, receives Smart Grid infrastructure that increases short run demand elasticity by about -0.1 in absolute value. This "Smart Grid" counterfactual scenario is compared to a "No Smart Grid" scenario in which these consumers remain without real time pricing and have no change in demand elasticity. The results counter a seemingly-obvious intuition about the e¤ects of real-time electricity pricing: short run supply models 3 predict that high prices in peak hours will fall once consumers are exposed to those prices and reduce quantity demanded. In long run equilibrium, however, entering "peaker" power plants earn zero pro…ts, meaning that RTP must either reduce peak electricity prices and increase Capacity Market revenues, or vice versa. As I will illustrate both intuitively and quantitatively, higher peak electricity prices and lower Capacity Market prices would likely obtain.
Reducing the exercise of unilateral market power has been a critical issue in discussions by economists and market operators and is often cited as a motivation for real-time pricing and other "demand response" programs that increase wholesale market demand elasticity. Despite this, the counterfactual simulation results show that the e¢ ciency gains through this channel are small relative to the e¤ects of forestalled entry. The intuition for this result is that …rms set markups based on their perceived residual demand elasticity, which is the elasticity of other …rms' supply plus the demand elasticity from RTP. Only at relatively high prices is supply su¢ ciently sparse that additional demand elasticity has a noticeable e¤ect, and the market clears at these high prices in only a few hours each year. In an industry where capacity is a substantial part of the cost structure, however, the capacity reduction that would result from increasing demand elasticity is a substantial potential source of welfare gains.
The base case analysis concludes that, given the assumed demand parameters, the annual gross welfare bene…ts would be just over $300 million per year. To determine net welfare gains from Smart Grid technologies, these bene…ts would be subtracted from estimates of infrastructure costs, which vary widely.
The paper proceeds by providing background on the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland electricity market, including the details of the bidding process and Capacity Market. This is followed by a description of the demand functions, in Section 3, and then a discussion of the public and con…dential cost data to be exploited, in Section 4. Section 5 presents the second stage of the two-stage model, including …rms' …rst order conditions, the process of backing out unobservable forward contracts, and the learning algorithm. Section 6 details the …rst stage, including the entry decision and my model of the Capacity Market. Section 7 presents the counterfactual simulation results, and Section 8 concludes.
The Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland Electricity Market
In 1927, three electric utilities in the mid-Atlantic region of the United States recognized the potential gains from trade in electricity supply and joined together to form a "power pool" called PJM. Now the world's oldest and largest power pool, PJM was also on the forefront of electric power deregulation, becoming the …rst market certi…ed under the federal restructuring rules of the late 1990s. Because of its size and importance, PJM is an excellent "laboratory" to study the potential e¤ects of the Smart Grid, real-time pricing, and demand elasticity on a restructured wholesale market.
At the time of the April 2003-March 2004 study period 4 , electricity ‡owing through PJM served 25 million people's homes and businesses in seven states and the District of Columbia. See Figure  10 .1 for a map of PJM's geographic footprint. Table 9 .1 provides an overview of market conditions during the study period. The ‡ow of electric power averaged 37,400 megawatts (MW), reaching a maximum of 61,500 MW on the afternoon of August 22nd, 2003.
Total available capacity was approximately 80,000 MW, about eight percent of the US total 5 . During the study period, there were 45 distinct …rms bidding into the market, which between them owned just over 500 electricity generating units. Table 9 .1 illustrates the distribution of capacity ownership, showing that the largest six …rms own approximately two-thirds of capacity. As a frame of reference, a typical home uses just over a kilowatt of power, and a typical power plant might have capacity between 100 and 1000 megawatts. Figure 10 .2 shows the short-run supply curve, highlighting three major production technologies. The lowest units on the supply curve are baseload coal-…red and nuclear plants, some large enough to power millions of homes. These plants have high …xed and low variable cost and typically run continuously except for scheduled maintenance periods during low-priced "shoulder months" in the spring and fall. The highest units on the curve are smaller peaker plants fueled by oil and natural gas, which employ gas turbine or steam turbine technologies that entail lower capital costs but less e¢ cient fuel use and thus higher variable cost. In between in both size and cost structures are mid-merit facilities, typically smaller coal plants and combined-cycle plants that run on natural gas. The model will include entrant …rms corresponding to these three technologies 6 .
A key stylized fact of electricity markets is the "hockey stick" shape of the short run supply curve. This is created by a small number of old, ine¢ cient plants with high marginal costs and often large additional markups above cost. The hockey stick shape means that equilibrium prices will be relatively low in most hours of the year, but can spike by an order of magnitude or more for a small number of hours. These peak hours are of particular interest because they account for a substantial ‡ow of revenues from consumers to producers. The inelasticity of peak supply means that an increase in demand elasticity from real-time pricing and the Smart Grid, even if providing only a small change in quantity demanded, can substantially reduce peak prices in the short run.
Purchasing from the wholesale market are retailers, or Load Serving Entities, which then resell electricity to residential, commercial, and industrial customers. These retailers are principally the investor-owned utilities that had been regulated monopolies until the past 15 years of restructuring, such as Public Service Electricity and Gas in New Jersey, Baltimore Gas and Electric, and Potomac Electric Power Company in Washington, D.C. Retail prices set by these …rms are regulated by state Public Utilities Commissions such that they earn a market rate of return on investment. The model will abstract away from the role of the retailer and directly model wholesale market demand curves.
PJM Interconnection, LLC, is a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), charged by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission with operating and providing open access to the transmission network, clearing the market, and ensuring reliability and e¢ ciency. This latter duty means that PJM is responsible for limiting the exercise of unilateral market power and is interested in market design that can help it to do so. As part of the regulatory arrangements that grew out of US electricity restructuring, PJM also maintains an independent Market Monitor charged with market design and oversight. PJM operates several markets, the largest of which are the Energy and Capacity Markets.
The Energy Market is a daily reverse auction for electricity. The day before each Energy Market, every generating unit submits a supply function consisting of a maximum of ten segments, plus startup costs. Given a set of bids by generators, quantities demanded by customers, and transmission constraints, PJM sets the lowest-cost production schedule and computes the Locational Marginal Price at each node of the transmission network 7 .
Producers'incentives to exercise market power in the Energy Market depend on their net long or short position when they submit bids. On the order of ten percent of electricity is sold at spot through the Energy Market 8 , while the remainder is sold via bilateral contracts or transferred within vertically-integrated …rms. A generating company that already has …xed price contracts for all of its production has no incentive to a¤ect prices in the Energy Market. Many of the …rms in PJM are vertically integrated between electricity generation and retail. If a …rm's retail obligations in a particular hour exactly match its production, it similarly has no incentive to exercise market power. Financial hedging, through instruments such as options and futures, is also commonplace, but there is little useful public data on …rms'hedge positions.
As Table 9 .3 shows, PJM had a Her…ndahl index of 926 over the study period. As the …rst order conditions for pro…t maximizing bids will indicate, however, …rms set prices for each unit based on the concentration of competing …rms'capacity in the same price range. The Her…ndahl index is higher in particular portions of the supply curve, ranging from 1170 between $0 and $50 bids to 4301 for bids between $500 and $1000. The PJM Market Monitor estimates that the average markup of market-clearing bids over marginal cost averaged 10 percent in 2003, with much higher markups in peak hours.
Since generating …rms are often regional, transmission constraints can produce highly concentrated local markets. In the Energy Market in 2003, the Market Monitor's primary tool for restraining the exercise of local market power was o¤ er capping, in which any unit whose operation was required to relieve a transmission constraint had its bid mitigated and instead received its reported marginal cost plus ten percent. On average, two to three units were o¤er-capped in each hour of the study period. Although o¤er capping means that it is di¢ cult for …rms to capitalize on local market power, …rms still may exercise market power generated by higher concentration in particular ranges of the market-wide supply curve, in particular during peak hours. Therefore, my model will endogenize this exercise of market-level market power, while abstracting away from local market power.
PJM's second largest market is the Capacity Market. Each year, PJM predicts the quantity to be demanded in the peak hour three years hence and increases this by a 13 percent cushion 9 called the Planning Reserve Margin, thereby arriving at the Reserve Margin requirement. In practice, revenues from the Energy Market and payments for other "ancillary services" are insu¢ cient to maintain that amount of capacity, and there is some shadow cost of the additional entry or forestalled exit. The Capacity Market was designed to ensure su¢ cient capacity as demand grows over time by transferring that shadow cost to producers. This is purely an administrative market; no actual electricity is traded.
To operationalize the Capacity Market 10 , PJM's analysts set a simple, a¢ ne, downward sloping demand curve such that they expect market clearing quantity to be near the Reserve Margin requirement. Incumbent …rms and entrants bid their capacity into the auction, and the market clears at the intersection of the aggregate capacity supply curve and the administratively-determined demand curve. Plants later receive their Capacity Payment based on the proportion of peak hours when their capacity is available, and each Load Serving Entity pays a share of total Capacity Market costs proportional to its share of peak load. The two other major wholesale electricity markets in the eastern United States also include Capacity Markets, and so the model I employ and the resulting intuition is generalizable beyond PJM.
Demand Functions
The simulation model will require demand parameters and for two di¤erent market segments, the "Smart Grid Group," which for the sake of argument is assumed to be one-…fth of the market, and the "Rest of Market." To keep the demand side as simple and as transparent as possible, I use a simple semi-log demand speci…cation 11 with no substitution across hours 12 . Combining the quantities demanded for the two market segments, the aggregate wholesale market demand function 13 for hour h of day d is:
e ; = Demand parameters for Smart Grid Group and Rest of Market, respectively e hd ; hd = Demand shifters for Smart Grid Group and Rest of Market, respectively
All parameters are the same in both future counterfactuals, except that e takes value zero in the "No Smart Grid" scenario and some non-zero value in the "Smart Grid" scenario. Each parameter has distinct economic implications. The bigger e is, the more that equilibrium prices, markups, and entry will vary between the No Smart Grid and Smart Grid counterfactuals. The demand shifters and e re ‡ect underlying hourly demand patterns -how much power consumers want on a hot summer day, for example, or on a mild afternoon in a "shoulder month" in the spring or fall. 1 1 There is very little evidence on the shape of demand functions for any customer type, but this speci…cation gives the intuitive result that the absolute change in quantity demanded for a given absolute change in price is decreasing in price. Most previous econometric estimations and market simulations, including Wolak and Patrick (2001) , Borenstein (2005) , Holland and Mansur (2006) , and others, specify constant elasticity, also implying decreasing absolute changes to quantity demanded per unit change in price. While this seems reasonable in some ranges of price, it is also possible that there is relatively little elasticity until price reaches some threshold. 1 2 Assuming away substitution across hours substantially simpli…es the producer's problem and the equilibrium computation, and this speci…cation will still produce the key desired result that equilibrium quantity demanded will increase during the o¤-peak hours and decrease on-peak. 1 3 The demand function for the Rest of Market group, and analogously for the Smart Grid group, can be derived using Roy's identity from the following indirect utility function:
This will be used later for welfare analysis.
The distribution of these parameters, which some call the "peakiness" of load, will in ‡uence the distribution of equilibrium prices and the relative pro…tability of di¤erent entrant technologies. Baseline demand parameters are speci…ed to correspond to the weather and market conditions over the April 2003 to March 2004 study period. The Rest of Market demand parameter is calibrated based on the proportion of consumers on di¤erent pricing structures in 2003 and the demand elasticity estimated in Patrick and Wolak (2001) 14 . The total demand shifters + e are then backed out from the observed market level equilibrium prices and quantities for each hour the simulation study period. Because I assume for the counterfactuals that the Smart Grid Group is one-…fth of the market, the Rest of Market demand shifter is simply 80 percent of the total demand shifter. To project into the future and accommodate entry in the simulations, the demand shifters are in ‡ated to re ‡ect a continuation of recent demand growth trends.
For the 8 average gigawatts of Smart Grid consumers, I simply want some sensible assumption for e , and I also will carry out two sensitivity analyses, with e increased and decreased by 50 percent. I use e = 650 megawatts per log(dollar per megawatt-hour) for the "Smart Grid" scenario, which corresponds to a price elasticity of approximately -0.1. The e parameters are such that the Smart Grid group demand functions are "anchored" at $25/MWh, meaning that quantity demanded is above (below) one-…fth of the original observed market quantity when prices are below (above) $25/MWh. At a price of $100/MWh instead of $25/MWh, which is the 98.5th percentile of prices, this implies that the Smart Grid Group demands 400 MW less power than it does at $25/MWh, or about 5 percent. At $200/MWh, the Smart Grid Group would demand 600 MW less, or about 7.5 percent.
Data
There are three primary data sets, all relevant to the April 2003 through March 2004 study period. The …rst dataset includes entrants' …xed and variable cost parameters, as detailed in Table 9 .2. These are from publicly-available engineering data, which are considered to be reasonable representative estimates, and they therefore need not be estimated. Entrants' input costs, speci…cally for fuel and tradable air pollution emission allowances, are set to match those observed over the study period.
The second dataset includes the bids from all auctions over the study period, which PJM makes available on its website after a six-month delay. The …rm and unit identi…ers in these data are masked but consistent. These publicly-available bids will be used to non-parametrically estimate the distribution of opponents'bids that each …rm perceives. Table 9 .3 details these data, including the number of …rms, average bids, Her…ndahl indices, and input and output prices over the study period. Figure 10 .3 illustrates the supply functions o¤ered by several example …rms on an example day.
The third dataset comprises the bid and con…dentially-reported marginal cost functions for all incumbent …rms during the study period. The PJM Market Monitor has taken the unusual step of allowing my access to these data for the purposes of this study. By law, each generating unit in PJM must con…dentially submit its marginal cost function to the Market Monitor, which uses the information to set the o¤er caps paid if the unit's bids are mitigated due to local market power.
In practice, there are no great concerns that the marginal cost data are biased due to strategic misreporting 15 . Table 9 .4 presents the distribution of markups observed over the study period.
These data are very useful for two reasons. First, without the con…dential cost estimates, I would have followed the typical electricity market model by computing unit level marginal costs from public data on on the monthly average "heat rate" (the rate of transformation of fuel to electricity) and estimated fuel costs. While this publicly-available information is extraordinarily detailed and accurate in comparison to the data available to study other industries, it is still problematic. Using a monthly average heat rate does not capture nonlinearities in the production function, and in particular the e¢ ciency loss as a unit operates near capacity. This causes the analyst to understate …rms'costs at high quantities and thus overstate markups. In this application, overstating initial markups would cause the model to overstate the e¤ect of additional demand elasticity in reducing those markups. Furthermore, plants have di¤erent contractual arrangements for fuel that are not observed in the public data, and using regional averages adds noise to the cost estimates.
Second, even if these cost estimates were reliable, it is di¢ cult to correctly match them to the masked …rms identi…ers in the publicly-available bidding data. Having matched bidding and cost data allows me to take costs as known, unlike in the typical empirical auction analysis, which estimates bidders'costs or private values. This allows me to instead model unobservables corresponding to forward contract positions, which are not fully observable. Both theoretically and empirically, these forward contract positions are well-understood to a¤ect bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions, and in electricity markets in particular (e.g. Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2008) 
Model Overview
The second stage subgames determine hourly market clearing prices and quantities for each of the 365 daily Energy Markets over the simulation. The model computes these equilibria conditional on the demand functions described in the previous section, incumbents'exogenous available capacity, and the total capacity of each entrant technology as determined by the …rst stage. This section derives the …rst order conditions, speci…es …rms'beliefs over other …rms'bids, backs out unobserved forward contracts implied by the initial study period equilibrium, and …nally implements a learning algorithm to move from the initial equilibrium to the future counterfactuals.
Before proceeding, it's important to lay out why learning could be one of the sensible ways to simulate counterfactuals in this setting. The motivating concern is that there may be multiple equilibria in multi-unit auction games. This has been shown in the complete information supply function equilibrium (SFE) setting by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and in the incomplete information share auction framework by Wilson (1979) .
A common response to multiple equilibria in any setting is to restrict the game such a unique equilibrium obtains. Unfortunately, a unique equilibrium has been shown to obtain only through assumptions that are unrealistic in this application, including linear supply functions, symmetric …rms (Green and Newbery 1992), constant marginal costs (Holmberg 2007) , or fully inelastic demand (Holmberg 2008 ). An alternative simpli…cation is to assume that …rms play a Cournot game. Not only is this unsatisfying in the sense that it bears little resemblance to the actual price setting process in electricity markets, it has been shown that Cournot prices are higher than any obtainable in supply function equilibrium except at the highest realization of the demand shifter (Green and Newbery 1992, Baldick and Hogan 2006) 16 .
Learning algorithms exploit the fact that past equilibria provide information useful for equilibrium selection, making assumptions on how …rms move from past to future equilibria while relaxing the above assumptions about …rms and their strategy spaces. Myopic learning algorithms, in which agents iteratively best respond to opponents'play from previous iterations, are most commonly used because myopia greatly reduces computational and conceptual complexity 17 . Learning for equilibrium selection has seen several more recent applications in counterfactual simulations, including Lee and Pakes (2009) Electricity markets are a particularly reasonable place to use myopic learning for equilibrium selection. The complexity of …rms' decision problems suggests that they might experiment with di¤erent strategies instead of directly solving for an equilibrium 18 , and the daily repetition of auctions provides them with ample opportunity to do so 19 . There is anecdotal evidence that such experimentation occurs 20 and empirical evidence that …rms learn over time towards pro…t-maximizing bids 21 .
There are several reasons to be cautious about using learning for equilibrium selection. First, although it seems plausible that some form of learning may occur in this setting, there are a panoply of apparently-reasonable learning algorithms, and Lee and Pakes (2009) …nd that di¤erent algorithms can lead to notably di¤erent results. While I will focus on results from one particular algorithm, I will also document that other plausible algorithms lead to similar counterfactual equilibrium bids. Second, learning algorithms sometimes do not converge to a stable equilibrium and instead cycle between actions, making results di¢ cult to interpret. Principally because of the uncertainty over competitors'bids, however, the algorithm does converge to a stable pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
A third reason to be cautious in applying learning algorithms is that the assumption that agents are myopic, or alternatively that they believe that other agents'strategies are static, is often implausible (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) . The rollout of the Smart Grid to residential customers, however, would occur gradually over a period of years. Between any two daily iterations, the change in demand patterns would be very small, and …rms'strategies thus close to static, other things equal. Furthermore, because opponents'bids are not released until six months after the auction, …rms are less likely to exploit the repeated nature of the game to enforce dynamic collusive equilibria. While the claim is not that …rms literally follow myopic learning algorithms, this does appear to be a potentially-sensible alternative approach.
Setup and First Order Conditions
Before beginning, note that much of the upcoming discussion applies only the incumbents in the market during the April 2003 to March 2004 study period; the second-stage behavior of entrants will be discussed later. Also, instead of estimating and resimulating each of the 365 auctions, I reduce computational burden by focusing on 24 auctions, one for each day type (work day or weekend) in each month of the year 22 . To compute counterfactual equilibria, the aggregate supply function from each of these 24 auctions is used for all of the corresponding workdays or weekend days of the month.
I model an auction game in which a set of …rms submit pro…t maximizing bid functions in pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. There is a set of …rms F t bidding into each auction t. Each …rm submits a supply function S f t (P ), where f indexes …rms and d indexes the day corresponding to the auction t of the same day type and month. Recall that supply functions are simultaneously submitted the day before the auction for which they are valid, and they hold for the entire day. Making the strong but common assumption that there are no transmission constraints 23 , the hourly market clearing condition is:
P hd = Realized market-clearing price for hour h of day d 2 2 This is reasonable because there is surprisingly little day-to-day variation in bids: most of the variation is as input prices rise and fall over months and as …rms take units o-ine for extended maintenance in the spring and fall. Two auctions are selected for each month, the …rst Wednesday and the …rst Saturday. 2 3 Failing to model transmission constraints abstracts away from interesting strategic issues. As characterized in Wilson (2007) and Hogan (1997) , transmission constraints a¤ect how one unit's bids a¤ect pro…ts earned by the …rm's other units at di¤erent nodes of the network. Some …rms, and in particular those that own a small number of units exempted from o¤er capping due to a loophole in federal regulations, are able to modify bids for plants on one side of a transmission constraint so as to increase the Locational Marginal Prices received by their plants on the other side. In theory, the returns to this form of strategic behavior would be lower if the short-term price response inside the transmission constraint were stronger. Furthermore, the model determines only one system-wide hourly price, meaning that it cannot capture the reduction that short-term price response could cause in relative price volatility between di¤erent locations in the transmission network. It is not obvious, however, that the abstraction away from transmission constraints would substantially a¤ect the predicted market-wide welfare e¤ects. Much of the economics literature similarly assumes away transaction constraints, although it is acknowledged that this is unsatisfying.
S I (P ) = Import supply function (See Appendix I) Each …rm's supply function S f t (P ) is a step function composed of the price and quantity for up to ten segments for each of the …rm's generating units. Segment lengths are highly consistent across auctions, as …rms base them primarily on features of units' production technologies. I therefore model that the action space includes only the prices b f jt 2 [0; 1000] for the segments j = 1; :::; J f t available in auction t, while the segment length q f jt is exogenous. The set of segments J f t available in each auction is a function of maintenance decisions and forced outages, and this is also modeled as exogenous. Each segment has constant marginal cost C 0 f jt 2 [0; 1000], which varies from day to day due to changes in ambient temperatures 24 , fuel prices, and other factors.
As discussed in the market overview, there is substantial …nancial hedging, long term contracting, and vertical integration, meaning that a …rm's pro…ts on a particular day depend on prices and quantities of electricity sold forward as well as electricity sold into the Energy Market. For each hour h of auction day t, …rms have contracted forward a quantity QC f ht of electricity at price P C f ht . These contracts are assumed to be …xed before bids are set.
At the time of submitting bids for auction t, …rms have some information set f t regarding the distribution of demand and opponents'bids. From bidders'perspectives, the slopes of import supply and of the demand functions are known, but the 24 hourly demand shifters ht and e ht that will be realized over auction t are stochastic. Firms'beliefs about other …rms'bids b f t , which hold constant across all hours of auction t, will be detailed momentarily. For notational convenience, I de…ne a vector U f ht f ht ; e ht ; b f t g that contains all the variables uncertain from the perspective of …rm f . The elements of U f ht have continuous joint distribution f (u f ht ) over support U f ht 25 . The PJM system operator clears the market in each hour and "rations" the marginal segment such that market-level quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. I de…ne a variable q d f jht = q d f jht (b f t ; u f ht ) to be the quantity of segment j that would be dispatched into the market as a function of …rm f 's vector of bids b f t and a realization of uncertainty u f ht . The segment is not dispatched if its bid is above the market clearing price, fully dispatched if it is inframarginal, and partially dispatched if it is the price-setting segment:
A risk-neutral …rm submits a vector of bids b f t for its set of segments J f t to maximize pro…ts earned over the 24 hours of auction day t:
A key insight is that the …rst order condition for segment k's pro…t-maximizing bid can be simpli…ed by the fact that the segment only sets prices in some states of the world. In all other regions of the distribution of u f th , the segment is either inframarginal or extramarginal, and marginal changes in its bid b f kt do not a¤ect pro…ts. In the states of the world in hour h where segment k is marginal, P ht = b f kt , all of the …rm's segments with bids less than b f kt are dispatched with certainty, and all segments with higher bids are not dispatched. The …rst order condition is thus:
The function inside the integral is continuous because of the pro-rata rationing of q d f jht when j is on the margin, so the order of integration and di¤erentiation can be reversed. The above …rst order condition therefore also equals:
Each of the additive terms in the FOC can be simpli…ed. First, since the …rm's quantity supplied equals its residual demand DR f t , the change in the marginal unit's quantity dispatched equals the slope of residual demand at price b f kt :
Second, a term S f kt can be de…ned that captures …rm f 's expected total quantity dispatched when segment k is on the margin. Under the approximation of a continuous supply function 26 , this term includes all inframarginal segments and the entirety of segment k itself:
Finally, a term f kt is introduced, which represents the …rm's expected forward contract quantity in the states of the world in which segment k is on the margin:
This variable f kt is modeled as unobservable, and there is a quantity b f kt that rationalizes the observed bid for every segment in each auction. Making these substitutions and re-arranging, we have that the following …rst order condition characterizes pro…t-maximizing bids in a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium:
This …rst order condition is similar to the complete information Supply Function Equilibrium …rst order condition derived by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , except with residual demand replaced by an expectation of residual demand. The numerator S f kt f kt can be thought of as total capacity inframarginal to b f kt that is exposed to the prices of auction t instead of being contracted forward. If f kt = S f kt , all capacity is contracted forward, there is no incentive for bid shading, and setting b f kt = C 0 f kt maximizes pro…ts. The …rst order condition also resembles the standard monopoly pricing …rst order condition, as bidding a supply function allows the …rm to operate as a monopolist over residual demand at all points. The left hand side of the …rst order condition is marginal revenue. From o¤ering a drawing attention to an exercise of market power. This is problematic for the discretization of the continuous FOC, because it implies a cost to bidding additional steps, causing discretization to be biased in the sense of Kastl (2009a) .
Second, as suggested in the text, …rms may use heuristics based on their units'marginal cost functions to determine segment lengths. Marginal cost functions for the typical generating technology can be closely represented with fewer than ten steps.
Third, the observed bids may closely approximate pro…t maximizing strategies, as losses from submitting an incomplete bid schedule are small. Kastl (2009b) shows that the losses from bidding a spline instead of a continuous function are small for a …rm with many units, as they decline by the square of the number of bid points. Hortacsu and Puller (2008) show computationally that the losses from setting ex-post suboptimal bid prices for existing steps dwarf the losses from submitting a bid schedule with too few steps. marginal unit of capacity at price b f kt , the …rm receives revenue b f kt from the additional sale, but this reduces expected revenues from inframarginal capacity by
. The …rst order condition equates this marginal revenue with marginal cost C 0 f kt . As in any standard price setting problem, as residual demand becomes more elastic, pro…t maximizing markups are lower and prices approach marginal cost. This is the formal illustration of why the Smart Grid, real-time pricing, and other forms of demand response reduce the exercise of market power in electricity markets. For the counterfactuals, the additional demand slope e =b f kt from the simulated Smart Grid Group will be added to the existing demand slope =b f kt in the speci…cation of …rms'residual demand. For the moment, notice that for the Smart Grid's e¤ects to be consequential, the additional demand slope must not be negligible compared to the existing slope of residual demand.
While this approach is not unfamiliar, it contains several improvements over previous approaches to estimating multi-unit electricity auctions. The Wolak (2003) approach generates more algebraically-complex FOCs where the optimal bids for one segment depend on functions of the bids for the …rm's other segments. By assuming that other segments' bids were set optimally, recognizing that the FOC is automatically zero in the states of the world when the segment is not marginal, and admitting a common assumption about continuity, I generate a much simpler FOC that does not depend on the bids for the …rm's other segments. Furthermore, while the FOC is as simple as the complete information SFE case or the Hortacsu and Puller (2008) ex-post optimal case, we will see presently that this derivation admits incomplete information consistent with the typical empirical auctions approach.
Firms'Beliefs
Firm f 's expectation of residual demand slope E[DR 0 f t (b f kt )j f t ] is conditioned on an information set that is unobservable to the analyst. There have been several approaches to this problem. The standard supply function equilibrium setup assumes complete information, with uncertainty entering the …rm's optimization problem only through the demand shifter . Since only shifts the residual demand curve horizontally, …rms have no uncertainty about the slope of residual demand DR 0 f t (b f kt ), and the expectation operator is removed. Complete information means that …rms'bids are ex-post optimal, meaning that they are best responses to opponents'realized bids for auction t.
A second approach is to pool bids across multiple auctions and use a kernel smoothing procedure to determine a continuous distribution of competitors'bids. Inference about primitives is then made under the assumption that each …rm's bids maximized pro…ts subject to that distribution, following the approaches of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Hortacsu (2002) . The challenge in this setting is heterogeneity across auctions: …rms' marginal costs change from day to day, and the composition of bidders changes as units go o-ine for maintenance. If …rms observe heterogeneity that the analyst does not capture, pooling bids across auctions causes the analyst to overstate the extent of …rms' incomplete information, which can cause biased estimates of the underlying primitives, as illustrated by Krasnokutskaya (2009) .
In response to the heterogeneity problem, Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and Kuhn and Machado (2004) employ a third approach, an a priori assumption that …rms' supply function strategies be additively separable in price and private information. This implies that one …rm's private information can shift other …rms'residual demand horizontally, in the same way that the uncertain demand shifter shifts residual demand, but the slope of residual demand is certain. As a result, the same ex-post optimal …rst order condition obtains, again without the expectation operator. Under this restricted form of incomplete information, inference on the primitives in each auction could be made using only the bids from that auction, obviating the need to pool across heterogeneous auctions.
My approach pools across auctions and adjusts for heterogeneity by "homogenizing" bids using segment-speci…c functions of observables, as inspired by Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006). I assume that …rms know which competitors'segments k will bid into auction t and the lengths q gjt of those segments. Firms'expectations of other …rms'supply functions are characterized by the following equation:
D gj = Number of days that segment j of …rm g submits bids over the study period D gj = Set of days that the segment submits bids q gjt = "Length" of bid segment j of …rm g in auction t, in megawatts e b gjdt = Bid on day d, homogenized to correspond to auction t = Kernel function h = Kernel bandwidth The homogenized bid prices over the entire study period for each segment that bids into auction t are used to compute the …rm's expected residual demand slope. I assume that …rms'beliefs about heterogeneity are captured by the following segment-speci…c polynomial series regression of bids on observables over the set of days D gj that the segment is bid into the market: Figure 10 .4 illustrates this regression for two segments of an example unit. For this unit and many others, bids hold constant across multiple days, which may re ‡ect …xed price fuel contracts or other inertia. The relative stability of bids at weekly frequencies suggests stable values of C 0 f jt and f jt . Since bids are not made public for six months, however, these values are still unknown to other …rms, and most units'bids change substantially before past bids are revealed.
The expected bid b b gjt is computed based on the observables corresponding to each of the 24 re-simulated auctions. I then generate a vector of length D gj of the homogenized bids for auction t by adding the set of …tted prediction errors to b b gjt . This vector has the following characteristic element:
Intuitively, this procedure computes the "average" supply curve across all days of the study period, adjusting on observables for applicability to auction t. Figure 10 .5 illustrates …rms'expectations of the aggregate supply curve and its slope for an example auction on August 6th, 2003. Notice that for much of the supply curve, the slope is steeper than 400 MW/($/MWh). For any particular …rm, the slope of its residual demand would be less steep, but of the same order of magnitude. Under the demand parameters presented earlier, the additional demand slope from the Smart Grid is -650/P MW/($/MWh), which even at the relatively high price of $100/MWh is -6.5 MW/($/MWh). This additional demand elasticity therefore has little e¤ect on residual demand slope for any …rm. Indeed, a very large demand response program would be required to measurably a¤ect any …rm's residual demand slope. On the right side of the aggregate supply curve, however, supply has a very steep slope, there are fewer …rms bidding, and initial markups are substantially higher. Additional demand elasticity from the Smart Grid could thus have a measurable e¤ect on markups in that range.
Substituting these e b gjdt back into the residual supply speci…cation, di¤erentiating, and inserting this into the equation for residual demand slope, we have:
A triangular kernel is used for simplicity. Consistent with Hortacsu and Puller (2008), a bandwidth is chosen such that approximately two-thirds of observations in the kernel fall within $10/MWh of b f kt .
Three implications of the above assumptions should be acknowledged. First, if linear functions of econometric observables do not fully capture …rms'perception of heterogeneity across auctions, the procedure overstates their uncertainty. Second, in this and any other auction estimations where there may be multiple equilibria, pooling implicitly requires that the market is in the "same" equilibrium over the study period. Third, this speci…cation of beliefs is also heuristic, in the sense that I have not speci…ed a set of strategies consistent with these beliefs. This is a challenge in the multi-unit setting because heterogeneity across days can a¤ect …rms' pro…t maximizing bids through multiple channels -through costs C 0 f kt , unobservable forward contracts f kt , and through the expected residual demand slope -which are not all additively or multiplicatively separable in the …rst order condition. This di¤ers from the additively-separable homogenization possible in the common value single unit setting of Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006). While this speci…cation of beliefs simpli…es the analysis, it should be recognized as an a priori restriction.
This approach, however, may have substantial appeal over two previous approaches. First, the ex-post optimality assumption, as in Supply Function Equilibrium and the limited-incomplete information setup of Hortacsu and Puller (2008) , is di¢ cult to believe given that forward contracts and plant-speci…c input prices change from day to day in ways unobservable to other …rms. Furthermore, in any particular day's auction, the realized residual demand curve is "lumpy," and at high prices there may be substantial ranges within which there are only a few bids. As a result, the choice of kernel bandwidth used to smooth competitors'bids in estimating residual demand a¤ects the predicted primitives. This bandwidth choice e¤ectively becomes the analyst's opinion of the precision with which …rms perceived competitors'bids: a large bandwidth means that even competitors'bids that were realized far away from a bid a¤ected that …rm's belief of residual demand slope, while a small bandwidth implies that the …rm had more certainty about residual demand.
Second, heterogeneity has also been addressed by pooling across limited sets of auctions. Kastl (2009a) pools only across the four neighboring auctions, while Gans and Wolak (2008) pool only across auctions on days in neighboring months with similar peak quantity demanded. In my application and many others, however, fuel prices are di¤erent even from one month to the next, and the composition of bidders changes as new plants come online and plants go o-ine for maintenance. Homogenization is therefore a useful additional tool.
Backing Out Unobservable Contracts
When estimating auctions, the marginal cost (or equivalently in an ordinary auction, the bidder's private value) is typically unobservable. Primarily because there is little public information on …nancial hedging, however, forward contract quantities are di¢ cult to measure, and my access to the con…dentially-reported marginal cost data allows f kt to be unobservable. Given the above expected residual demand slope and the …rm's bids and marginal costs, the unobservables b f kt that rationalize incumbents'bids in each auction can be backed out: Figure 10 .6 shows the distribution of implied unobservables across all 24 re-simulated auctions.
If b f kt were taken literally as a measure of the …rm's forward contract position, the quantity
represents the proportion of the …rm's inframarginal capacity that is contracted forward at the time when segment k is expected to be on the margin. The majority of these realizations are between 0.5 and 1, with a higher density around 1. This is consistent with the high degree of vertical integration and extensive forward contracting that exist in this market. As in many applications, the pro…t function could be mis-speci…ed. While the unobservable b f kt enters the pro…t function in place of forward contract quantities, it in reality captures all factors that rationalize observed bids under my speci…cation of the game. These factors may include …rms'optimization error, a mis-speci…ed economic environment, for example due to transmission constraints, and mismeasured costs.
Although the cost data are very good, this source of speci…cation error may be important. For example, ramping constraints introduce dynamics into …rms'cost functions, inducing them to bid units above or below their reported static marginal costs. Furthermore, some plants are limited by environmental permits to a small number of annual hours of operation, and the shadow price of this constraint is not currently included in the cost estimates submitted to PJM. The model, however, interprets any di¤erence between reported static marginal costs and observed bids as an exercise of market power. If initial markups or markdowns were not actually an attempt to a¤ect prices, the model will be mistaken in re-simulating these bids closer to marginal cost. To test the importance of this sort of concern, the counterfactual simulations will include a sensitivity analysis under the assumption that the data overstate true markups by a factor of two.
Counterfactual Bids via Myopic Best Response
Having estimated the initial equilibrium, I now turn to the counterfactual simulation procedure, based on myopic learning. Both entry and the expansion of the Smart Grid would a¤ect incumbent …rms'residual demand slope, which in turn changes their pro…t maximizing bids. For each segment, holding …xed the initial S f kt , b f kt , and C 0 f kt , a new optimal bid can be computed in response to the new residual demand slope 27 . The changes in …rms'bids also a¤ect competitors'E[DR 0 f t (b f kt )j f t ], so the best response process is iterated. For each iteration r, each segment's pro…t maximizing bid b r f kt is the best response to the distribution of actions from the previous iteration:
Firms' expectations must be updated between each iteration. I model that …rms observe the auction-speci…c change in opponents' bids and update their mean expectation accordingly. The vector that contains …rms' beliefs of the distribution of opponents' bids now has characteristic element:
The equilibrium of the Energy Market game is the pure strategy steady state of this system, such that …rms'beliefs about their residual demand curves are consistent with the distribution of other …rms'bids. In practice, this steady state is de…ned by a su¢ ciently small average absolute percent di¤erence between bids from one iteration to the next:
K f t = Set of segments o¤ered by …rm f in auction t Figure 10 .7 illustrates this procedure on August 6th for an example …rm. Across bids by all …rms, Table 9 .5 presents the average absolute percent di¤erence for the …rst iterations of the example resimulated auction on that same example day. The algorithm converges to close to its tolerance within 10 iterations. 28 Figure 10.8 details the simulated change in markups from the introduction of the Smart Grid for all …rms in the auction on August 6th, 2003. Both negative and positive markups move toward marginal cost, particularly for bids that were initially between $200 and $800. The e¢ ciency gains from these e¤ects will depend on how frequently these high-markup units are actually dispatched in equilibrium.
This section has not yet discussed entrant …rms'behavior in the second stage. They are modeled as having the same …rst order conditions, and their costs are from engineering data presented earlier. These simulated entrants, however, have no initial b . Although for uniqueness to obtain in the two stage entry game it is useful to assume that entrant capacity is atomless, example plant sizes can be used to determine a reasonable value for this parameter. For peaker, combined cycle, and baseload entrants, respectively, the unobservables f kt are set to correspond to 400, 500, and 1000 megawatt plants that enter the auctions 50, 80, and 95 percent hedged. Entrants' residual demand slopes are computed as if entrant plants of these sizes were una¢ liated with other incumbent and entrant …rms. Because these entrant "…rms" are small and because their bids are set against a fairly elastic residual demand slope, their simulated markups are small, as shown in Table 9 .2.
The simulated entrants, of course, did not submit a distribution of bids over the April 2003 to March 2004 study period. For simplicity, I model that e b gjdt = b gjt for entrants, i.e. that competitors' residual demand slope is computed from entrants'actual bids, without additional uncertainty.
Alternative Learning Algorithms
Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and other work on learning in games has developed a multitude of learning algorithms, many of which are equally plausible for equilibrium selection in an applied setting. I experimented with a set of other common learning procedures to test the similarity of the results. Under an "Immediate Update" speci…cation, …rms update their expectations immediately after each competitor …rm changes its bids, instead of updating only between iterations. Under "Fictitious Play," …rms' expectations of a competitor's bids are updated based on the average of the competitor's play in all previous iterations, instead of the play in the most recent iteration. Under "Partial Best Response," the …rms that change bids in each iteration are randomly selected with probability 1/2. Under "Random Update Shock," …rms'beliefs are updated by the change in competitors'bids plus a mean-zero normally-distributed shock with standard deviation of one-half of the change. Under "Random Bid Shock," …rms bids (and competitors'beliefs about those bids) are the pro…t-maximizing bid plus a mean-zero normally-distributed error with standard deviation of …ve percent of the markup. After the …rst 15 iterations, the random bid shocks are suspended, and the algorithm is allowed to converge to a steady state equilibrium. Table 9 .6 compares the steady states of the alternative procedures. The …rst row presents the average absolute percent di¤erence between the initial equilibrium and the steady state of the myopic best response learning procedure detailed above. The subsequent rows are the average absolute percent di¤erence between the myopic best response steady state and the steady state under each alternative procedure. The results indicate that although the di¤erent algorithms should not be expected to converge to precisely the same steady state, they converge to counterfactual equilibria that are within 15 to 25 percent of the distance from the initial equilibrium.
First Stage: Entry Decision and the Capacity Market
Each …rm's Energy Market pro…ts in the equilibrium determined by the above learning algorithm become the part of the payo¤s in a two-stage entry model. This section details the …rst stage, where the set of players comprise potential entrant …rms of three technologies whose action spaces are amount of capacity entering. The model builds on Borenstein (2005) , but it di¤ers by including a set of incumbent …rms with exogenous capacity and by incorporating the Reserve Margin, which in equilibrium constrains the sum of entering capacity across the three technologies. A unique Nash Equilibrium in entering capacity is determined by zero-pro…t conditions: Energy Market revenues (determined in the game's second stage) plus Capacity Market revenues (the shadow price of the Reserve Margin) equal …xed costs.
It will be clear that the entry model is a highly stylized version of reality, and some the assumptions required for uniqueness will be strong. As the results will show, however, some model of entry is critical to understanding the e¤ects of the Smart Grid and real-time pricing. Furthermore, this relatively simple two-stage model gives intuitive insight into how Capacity Markets work in equilibrium.
Detailed Setup
The three entrant technologies, peaker, combined cycle, and baseload, are indexed by e 2 fp; c; bg. There are a large number of potential entrant …rms with each technology. Every unit of capacity within a technology is atomless and homogeneous: per-unit …xed costs are constant, there are constant returns to scale, and capacity within each technology behaves identically in the second stage Energy Markets. Although new plants may in reality be built by incumbent …rms, I assume that all new capacity is independent.
The players are potential entrants f , each with one technology e. Their action spaces are to set a non-negative capacity K f e 2 [0; 1). This results in a vector K = fK p ; K c ; K b g of total entering capacity of each technology 29 . Because capacity within each technology is homogeneous, this vector is a su¢ cient statistic for …rst stage actions; entrant plant size and the number of distinct …rms that own these plants are both indeterminate. The set I of 45 incumbent …rms in PJM have existing capacity K i 2 fK 1 ; K 2 ; :::; K 45 g.
Each unit of capacity that actually enters incurs a certain annualized …xed cost F C e . Because this is a static game and entrants thus cannot later exit, this …xed cost combines the amortized sunk cost of entry as well as annualized …xed operating and maintenance costs. Although the second stage includes incomplete information and uncertainty over demand from day to day, the sum of entrants'second stage pro…ts over the life of the plant is assumed to be known with certainty. For …rms of each of the three entrant technologies, the annualized pro…t function per unit of capacity is: The equilibrium is such that no entrant …rm could make higher pro…ts by not entering, and no potential entrant who does not enter could make higher pro…ts from entry. Since pro…ts from non-entry are de…ned to be zero, actual entrants must also earn zero pro…ts. An equilibrium vector of entering capacity K thus must ful…ll the following zero pro…t conditions:
; 8e 2 fp; c; bg (21)
The Capacity Market
The Capacity Market is fundamentally a mechanism to transfer the shadow price of the Reserve Margin constraint to capacity owners. To model this market, I make three assumptions. First, because sunk costs are relatively large, it is not unrealistic to assume that all incumbents clear in the Capacity Market, meaning that no incumbents exit and entrants are the marginal suppliers of capacity 30 . Second, the highly inelastic, administratively-determined Capacity Market demand curve is modeled as fully inelastic. Third, the distribution of entry has a negligible e¤ect on the markup of the marginal Energy Market bidder in the maximum-demand hour 31 . As a result of these, the Reserve Margin implies a constraint on total entry across the three technologies:
The total entry K rm required in equilibrium under the 13 percent Reserve Margin constraint is characterized by the following equation:
hd = Hour of maximum total demand shifter hd + e hd t = Auction corresponding to hd
In words, the total required entry K rm is such that the maximum-demand hour's demand function intersects the aggregate supply curve at the point where 13 percent excess capacity remains. Entrants'zero pro…t conditions pin down their bids at F C e D e (K), and this sets the equilibrium Capacity Market price:
Uniqueness, Computation, and Some Intuition
What remains is to …nd the equilibrium distribution of entry between the three technologies that satis…es all three zero pro…t conditions and the Reserve Margin constraint. Depending on whether second stage net pro…ts D(K) are large or small relative to …xed costs, the constraint might or might not bind. This gives two kinds of potential equilibria, "Constrained" and "Unconstrained." Although there are often multiple equilibria in games with heterogeneous entrants, there is indeed a unique equilibrium in both the Constrained and the Unconstrained games. This result is speci…c to multi-unit auctions in which entrants are independent of incumbents, marginal costs are consistently ordered, and entrants'e¤ects on markups are "local." The general intuition derives from Borenstein (2005) and extends his model to imperfectly competitive second stage subgames.
For intuition, consider the Constrained game and simplify to two entrant technologies, peakers and combined cycles. Assume the existence of an equilibrium distribution of capacity, K example = fK p ; K c g. A second equilibrium K 0 would have to satisfy two conditions. First, because …xed costs are constant and all technologies receive the same Capacity Market price, movement from K example to K 0 would have to entail equal changes in the two technologies'Energy Market pro…ts per unit of capacity in order for K 0 to also satisfy the zero pro…t conditions. Second, to remain on the Reserve Margin constraint, the change in capacity of one technology between K example and K 0 must be equal and opposite to the change for the other technology. Put concisely, equal and opposite changes in entering capacity must generate equal changes in per-unit Energy Market pro…ts.
These two conditions cannot both be satis…ed, and this second equilibrium K 0 therefore cannot exist. The reason is that in the Energy Market, combined cycle plants'bids are always less than peakers' bids, because the latter technology has higher marginal cost. Combined cycles are thus dispatched in all the hours that peakers are dispatched, plus many more. The price changes resulting from a change in combined cycle entry therefore have a large e¤ect on combined cycles' pro…ts relative to peakers'pro…ts. A change in peaker entry, on the other hand, has similar e¤ects on peaker and combined cycle pro…ts. This means that the changes in per-unit Energy Market pro…ts cannot be equal if the changes in capacity entered are required to be equal and opposite. Appendix II formalizes this intuition and uses similar logic to prove that the Unconstrained equilibrium is unique.
The equilibrium is computed via backwards induction, using a modi…cation of a secant-based algorithm called Broyden's method (Broyden 1965 ) to search in fK p ; K c ; K b g-space. The algorithm …rst searches for the Unconstrained equilibrium, which is the unique point such that annual Energy Market Revenues D e (K) are equal to annualized …xed costs F C e for all technologies. If P e2fp;c;bg
K rm in the Unconstrained equilibrium, the constraint has zero shadow cost, the Capacity Price R is zero, and this is the counterfactual equilibrium. In practice, the Unconstrained equilibrium violates the Reserve Margin constraint. The algorithm then searches for the unique point on the constraint where the di¤erence between Energy Market Revenues D e (K; C e ) and …xed costs F C e for all technologies is the same. The Capacity Market price is the payment per megawatt of capacity to each technology that is required to bring entrants to zero pro…ts. See Appendix III for more details on this procedure. Underlying all these calculations is some straightforward economic intuition about entry. Increased demand elasticity reduces peak quantity demanded, which through the Reserve Margin rule mechanically reduces total entering capacity. This implies reduced capital expenditures for new power plants, which is the crucial element of welfare gains.
The distribution of entering capacity between the di¤erent technologies is determined by the combination of the distribution of demand shifters across the hours of the year and the aggregate supply curve from incumbent plants. For example, if demand is relatively constant, total equilibrium supply will favor baseload plants. If the distribution of demand shifters has high variance, total equilibrium supply will include more peaker plants. Entrants essentially "…ll in" the di¤erence between total equilibrium supply and existing incumbent supply.
Intuitively, one might also expect that less required entry would reduce the Capacity Market price, because this is the shadow price of the minimum entry constraint. But because that shadow price also depends on second stage pro…ts, which are themselves a¤ected by entry, this need not be the case. The next section will return to this issue.
Counterfactual Simulation Results
The supply and demand models are now used to simulate the potential equilibrium e¤ects of expanding Smart Grid technology to one-…fth of the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland market. First, I detail how the interactions between entry and imperfect competition determine the Smart Grid's e¤ects on Energy and Capacity prices. Second, I present the welfare and distributional implications. Finally, I discuss sensitivity analyses, which show how changes in demand elasticities change the results. Table 9 .7 presents an overview of the results. Scenarios numbered 6 and 7 are the base case simulations for No Smart Grid ("No SG") and Smart Grid ("SG"), respectively, per the demand and supply models described above. The other scenarios are sensitivity analyses, including one pair of analyses under which markups are exogenous, which could also be thought of as an assumption of perfect competition.
Energy and Capacity Prices
As illustrated in Figure 10 .9, in the sensitivity analysis with exogenous markups, RTP increases prices in the top 10 percent of the distribution by an average of $0.95/MWh. This contradicts a closely-held conventional wisdom on real-time pricing, the Smart Grid, and other forms of demand response: they should reduce Energy Market prices in high demand hours. What explains these results?
Under exogenous markups, the increase in near-peak prices is explained by the e¤ects of the Capacity Market, which are illustrated by Figure 10 .10. Total entry K must be such that peak demand intersects the aggregate supply curve at a point that leaves a 13 percent Reserve Margin, giving K (SG) and K (N o SG) in the two scenarios. All three entrant technologies bid into the Energy Market at lower prices than a large set of ine¢ cient incumbents, and these incumbents will clear the market in the upper percentiles of prices in both scenarios. In the peak hour, e¤ectively the same incumbent plant -13 percent below the capacity limit in the aggregate supply curve -will clear the market 32 . This occurs at points A and B in the No SG and SG scenarios, respectively.
The additional downward-sloping demand from the Smart Grid reduces peak hour quantity demanded, and thus the entry induced by the Capacity Market, more than it reduces demand in any other hour. Maximum quantity demanded is 83.4 gigawatts with the Smart Grid, compared with 85.0 in the No SG scenario, producing a di¤erence of 1.6 gigawatts between point A and point B. The di¤erence between the 99th percentiles of quantity demanded, illustrated in points C and D, is only 0.9 gigawatts. Since the market cleared at e¤ectively the same point on the supply curve in the peak hour, and the Smart Grid reduces quantity demanded less at the 99th percentile than at peak, the 99th percentile of demand will clear at a higher price in the SG scenario than in No SG. In Figure 10 .10, this means that point D has a higher price than point C. This potentiallycounterintuitive result would not obtain without the inclusion of existing plants, making this in some sense a "medium-run" model.
If exit were endogenized, lower Energy Market revenues in the No SG scenario could induce more retirement compared to in the SG scenario. Figure 10 .11 illustrates the di¤erence in pro…ts between the SG and No SG scenarios under exogenous markups for ine¢ cient incumbents, showing that the Smart Grid reduces total pro…ts for the highest-cost plants by several percent. Di¤erential retirement under No SG relative to SG would reduce the di¤erence in near-peak Energy Market prices between the two scenarios, but it would not reverse the sign of the overall e¤ect.
Returning to Figure 10 .9, observe that prices in the top …ve percent of the distribution are lower when markups are endogenized. This is because the increase in residual demand elasticity causes pro…t-maximizing bids to drop towards marginal cost. This e¤ect is not large enough, however, to change the result that peak prices are still higher in the SG scenario.
Entrants make zero pro…ts in equilibrium, so the change in Energy Market revenues for entrant peaker capacity must be o¤set by changes in Capacity prices. As shown in Table 9 .7, the Smart Grid causes Capacity prices to drop from $40.2 to $39.2 per kilowatt per year. This reduces total annual Capacity Market payments by $156 million.
Welfare, Pro…ts, and Distributional E¤ects
As shown in Figure 10 .12, real-time pricing reduces electricity costs both for the Smart Grid Group and for the Rest of Market. Although peak Energy Market prices increase in the SG scenario, the Smart Grid Group's larger demand elasticity results in lower peak quantity demanded and thus lower Energy Market costs. Their share of peak hour quantity demanded, and thus their share of Capacity Market payments 33 , is also lower. Table 9 .7 presents this in terms of savings per average kilowatt of power demanded, which is roughly equivalent to an average US household. Each average kilowatt of residential, commercial, or industrial demand that adopts Smart Grid technologies saves $16.80 per year in wholesale electricity costs, or about 4.4 percent.
There are slight positive spillovers to the Rest of Market: the net e¤ect of the changes in Energy and Capacity expenditures is to reduce their overall costs by 0.13 percent. From an annual base of $16.4 billion dollars, Smart Grid technology at one-…fth of the market reduces total wholesale electricity costs for all consumers in both groups by 0.92 percent, or $151 million per year.
In equilibrium, adoption of retail Smart Grid technologies has only a small e¤ect on incumbent producers. This is because the three entrant technologies' zero pro…t conditions constrain incumbents with similar production technologies to the same total pro…ts in any scenario. Only producers with substantially di¤erent marginal costs than one of the entrant technologies will experience changes in pro…ts. As illustrated in Figure 10 .13, 1.7 gigawatts of entry is forestalled with the introduction of the Smart Grid, most of which takes the form of reduced entry of peaker capacity.
These numbers can be summarized in a basic welfare calculation that considers only the changes in producer pro…ts and "electricity-related compensating variation" for the Smart Grid Group and the Rest of Market. This "electricity-related compensating variation" considers only the welfare e¤ects of changes in electricity prices and price elasticity of demand. Because the net costs of Smart Grid technologies are highly uncertain and variable across utilities, these are excluded from the calculation. The basic welfare calculation gives annual welfare gains of $309 million, or $38.90 per average kilowatt of demand equipped with Smart Grid technologies. Table 9 .7 also presents sensitivity analyses under di¤erent demand parameters and supply model formulations. The …rst three columns present results under the assumption of …xed power plant capital stock. Scenario 1 is a baseline scenario that simply re-creates the market prices over the study period. Scenario 2 adds real-time pricing but holds …rms' bids constant, and scenario 3 accounts for imperfect competition by endogenously resimulating bids.
Sensitivity Analyses and Market Power
The next two columns, scenarios 4 and 5, compare No Smart Grid and Smart Grid scenarios, allowing entry but holding bids constant. Scenarios 6 and 7 are the preferred base case results for No SG and SG, respectively, in the model described in the text that endogenizes bidding and entry. Scenarios 8 and 9 reduce and increase, respectively, the Smart Grid demand parameter e by 1/2 in absolute value. Finally, scenarios 10 and 11 are identical to scenarios 6 and 7, except with the assumption that true marginal costs are halfway between each unit's bid and its reported static marginal cost.
The welfare e¤ects of the Smart Grid scale close to linearly with the demand system parameters. When the demand parameter e is halved in scenario 8, the annual welfare improvements drop to $19.2 per average kilowatt, and when they are doubled, the welfare improvements increase to $58.4 per average kilowatt.
Although reducing producers' market power has been an important motivation for policies and technologies that increase the price elasticity of demand, the reduction in markups is not an important channel of welfare gains. This is illustrated by comparing the base case scenarios 6 and 7 to scenarios 5 and 6, which are identical except that they take producers'markups as exogenous. The annual welfare gain from the Smart Grid under exogenous markups vs. endogenous markups are almost identical. The intuition for this result is that although the additional demand elasticity does reduce markups, it only does so at high prices where residual supply is inelastic, and the market clears at these prices only in a small number of hours each year.
Conclusion
This paper carries out counterfactual simulations of the e¤ects of the Smart Grid on the PennsylvaniaJersey-Maryland restructured wholesale market, using a unique model that captures both imperfect competition and entry. I present an equilibrium selection mechanism based on myopic learning that allows detailed counterfactual analysis in a multi-unit auction without the functional form assumptions usually required to obtain a unique equilibrium. The model also endogenizes entry, which is an important channel of welfare gains, and predicts equilibrium prices in the Capacity Market.
The results include several contributions to how economists, …rms, and policymakers might think about increases in demand elasticity from the Smart Grid and real-time pricing. First, the analysis includes new intuition about the interactions between the markets for Energy and Capacity, including the proposition that increased demand elasticity may actually increase peak and nearpeak Energy Market prices. Second, demand elasticity is important for welfare primarily because it reduces peak demand, and thus the entry of new capacity required under the Reserve Margin; the additional e¢ ciency gains from reducing producers'market power appear to be second-order. Finally, Smart Grid technologies could have large gross welfare e¤ects, but whether these changes increase net welfare depends on the cost of the new infrastructure, which is still highly uncertain. 
Appendix I: Import Elasticity

Appendix II: Uniqueness
This appendix proves the uniqueness of pure strategy interior equilibria in both the Constrained and Unconstrained entry games. Most fundamentally, uniqueness obtains for three reasons: entering capacity is independent of existing …rms, bids by the three entrant technologies have a consistent order, and entry has only small and local e¤ects on markups.
Conditions
Begin by de…ning a function e e (K), the total annualized pro…t for an entrant of technology e net of Capacity Price R:
Note that entrant technologies'bids are consistently ordered b b < b c < b p . For e; f s.t. b e > b f , the set of hours in which e runs is therefore contained within the set of hours that f runs. This means that any change in prices above b e will have an equal e¤ect on the pro…ts of e and f .
Entry by capacity of technology e has two e¤ects. Through the "shifting" e¤ect, the entrant shifts the portion of the supply curve beginning with its bid b e to the right, reducing market clearing prices in all hours where they had been above b e . Through the "competition" e¤ect, the entrant increases the elasticity of residual demand for other …rms' segments nearby in the supply curve, moving pro…t maximizing bids closer to marginal cost. The proof uses three conditions that rely on the reality that the competition e¤ect is both small and local to b e . Condition 1 is Equal Downward Pro…t Stealing: additional peaker capacity equally a¤ects the pro…ts per unit capacity of the two lower technologies. Entry by peakers only a¤ects prices in hours when the market clears near or above b p , and since both lower technologies are dispatched in all those hours, their pro…ts are equally a¤ected.
Condition 2 is Equal Pro…t Stealing from Below: additional combined cycle and baseload entry have equal e¤ects on peaker pro…ts. This follows because the shifting e¤ect from any entrant lower in the supply curve has the same impact on peakers'pro…ts, and the competition e¤ects are local and thus do not a¤ect prices near b p .
Condition 3 is Unequal Relative Pro…t Stealing: entering capacity of a particular technology has a greater e¤ect on its own pro…ts than on the pro…ts of technologies higher in the supply curve. The intuition is that entering capacity of technology e reduces prices near and above b e , but technologies with higher bids are exposed to less of that range than is technology e.
Finally, two regularity conditions are required to allow e e (K) to be di¤erentiated. Condition 4 is that there is a unique equilibrium in the second stage subgames, as discussed in the body of the paper. Condition 5 is that the pro…t functions e e (K) are continuous in K. All …ve conditions hold 8fK p ; K c ; K b g 2 R 3+ .
Constrained Equilibrium
Lemma: Under Conditions 1-5, if an interior equilibrium exists in the Constrained game, it is the unique interior pure strategy equilibrium. Proof: The proof proceeds from an initial equilibrium K . It assumes that a second equilibrium K 0 = K + K exists and characterizes that equilibrium. Finally, it shows that this characterization contradicts the above conditions except in the trivial case where K = 0.
In equilibrium, all entrants earn zero pro…ts, meaning that e is the same for all entrant technologies and equal in absolute value to the Capacity Price R. If another interior equilibrium K 0 exists, the change in e between K and K 0 must be equal for all technologies:
These two equalities can be implicitly di¤erentiated and then reintegrated over the space between K and K 0 , giving two "equal pro…t change" conditions: Z
Unconstrained Equilibrium
Lemma: Under Conditions 1-5, if an interior equilibrium K > 0 exists in the Unconstrained game, it is the unique interior pure strategy equilibrium. Proof: Here again, I assume a distinct equilibrium K 0 = K + K, characterize the equilibrium, and then show that the …ve Conditions can be used to contradict the characterization.
In this situation, instead of equal pro…t conditions, we have zero pro…t conditions which must hold for each technology over K. As before, each of these conditions can be di¤erentiated using the Implicit Function Theorem and re-integrated over K:
As before, the Equal Downward condition can be integrated and substituted into the equality between the baseload and combined cycle pro…t functions to pin down the relationship between K c and K b . This can then be substituted into the peaker and combined cycle zero pro…t conditions:
Each of these two zero-pro…t conditions holds along a particular line. For the peaker zero-pro…t condition, for example, any combined entry (K c +K b ) requires a unique o¤setting K p to keep the peakers at zero pro…ts. The Unequal Upward condition, however, gives that a larger change in peaker entry is required to o¤set a given (K c +K b ) in the combined cycle zero-pro…t equation than in the peaker equation. These two conditions can thus only hold simultaneously if K = 0:
The existence of an interior equilibrium with positive entry of all three technologies depends on e (K), and in particular each technology's Energy Market pro…ts. In the simulations, an interior equilibrium is computed; this represents well the fact that in the actual markets, entry by all three technologies is expected. If entry of one technology were predicted to be zero, it is straightforward to show uniqueness in the class of boundary equilibria where that technology has zero capacity. This logic could also be extended to a larger number of technologies, or a continuum of technologies, using the same conditions.
Appendix III: Search Procedure for Equilibrium Entry
I search for the unique interior equilibrium in the Constrained and the Unconstrained games. The algorithm …rst calculates Unconstrained equilibrium, and if the Reserve Margin constraint is not satis…ed, recomputes the solution along the Reserve Margin constraint.
In the Unconstrained game, the three zero pro…t conditions form an unconstrained system of nonlinear equations with a unique solution. Since the Capacity price is zero in the Unconstrained game, the zero pro…t conditions are: e e (K) D e (K) F C e = 0; 8e 2 fp; c; bg (42) Since computation of the pro…t function values involves re-simulation of the second-stage subgames, e¢ ciency is important and analytical computation of gradients is not possible. I thus use Broyden's method (Broyden 1965) , which …nds the roots of a nonlinear system using secant approximations of the gradients.
The computation algorithm for the Unconstrained game is:
1. Compute the initial Jacobian J 0 from starting value K 0 and three nearby points.
2. Beginning at step s = 1, iterate until e (K) is su¢ ciently small:
(a) Compute a new set of trial capacities K s based on the current best guess at the equilibrium:
(b) Update the Jacobian using the three most recent trial capacities.
If the total capacity in the Unconstrained equilibrium does not satisfy the Reserve Margin constraint, the algorithm then computes the Constrained equilibrium using a modi…ed version of Broyden's method applicable to nonlinear problems with linear constraints on the decision variables.
The solution to the system is no longer completely determined by the zero pro…t constraints e (K) = 0. Instead, it is determined by two equal pro…t constraints, e p (K) = e m (K) = e b (K), and the (binding) reserve margin requirement P e2fp;c;bg K e = K rm . These constraints can be solved, stacked, and applied to the current iteration's Jacobian, J s , to compute the new value of K. The equal pro…t constraints can be written as:
The Reserve Margin constraint can be written as:
e2fp;c;bg
The algorithm is thus:
1. Begin with initial Jacobian J 0 and capacities K 0 . 
Iterate until
(b) Update the Jacobian using the three most recent trial capacities. These data are smoothed so as not to reveal the markups of individual units.
Changes in Price Distribution
